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Abstract: Some symbols so skillfully traverse epochs and cultures that they are
depicted as almost “natural” embodiments of abstract values. The balance is
one of these symbols, adopted to represent justice from ancient Egypt until the
present time. Power appropriates this “natural meaning” in order to construct a
rhetoric of fairness. Yet, semiotics unveils that the balance, like every symbol, is
not natural at all, but underpinned by a specific ideology. From the semiotic
point of view, the balance is a device that produces indexes, i. e., causal signs
that visually signal an invisible property, weight. Although this translation is not
automatic, but based on specific indexical circumstances (such as the type of
balance, the weighing techniques, and the measuring standards that are used),
the balance is paradoxically turned into a symbol of justice precisely because it
is depicted as a non-semiotic device, as an instrument that cannot lie, as a
machine.
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A quan cannot on their account increase or
decrease its number, a beam cannot on their account make
heavier or lighter its measure. If others know that using
the quan or beam will not bring them advantage, they will
not use them precisely for that reason.
– Guanzi jiaoshi, 521 (“Mingfa jie”)
1 Introduction: The unnaturalness of symbols
Throughout history, elements of reality such as animals, plants, minerals, or
everyday objects have often turned into symbols of abstract concepts or ideas,
like wisdom, compassion, generosity, etc. Philologists seek to describe the
tortuous paths through which elements of reality become symbols. Research in
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this domain is intriguing, as well as arduous, for the communicative force of
symbols often transcends cultural frontiers. Yet, symbols that travel across time
and space do not stay unchanged, but are diffracted in a myriad of subtly
different significations. History explains how reality turns into symbol, but
does not explain why. Semiotics must complement history in accounting for
the laws of symbolic imagination. That serves not only the purposes of curiosity
but also those of anthropology. Every symbol conveys a deep-seated human
need, which historical and cultural circumstances then press through the filter
of specific words, images, and signs.
A fundamental difference, however, holds between symbology and semio-
tics. Various “dictionaries of symbols” are available in the market. Yet, they are
likely to poignantly disappoint professional semioticians. Entries in these dic-
tionaries indeed customarily limit themselves to expose, in a more or less
elaborate manner, an equation between object, past, and meaning. The semi-
otician’s disappointment stems from the wider ambition of the discipline. Unlike
symbology, semiotics is not content with establishing the equation and tracing it
back to a certain history and civilization; semiotics dares seeking to understand
why a particular object, among many, was selected to visualize the invisible and
give expression to what is abstract, imperceptible. What anthropological laws of
imagination are at work behind a symbol? And how do they evolve across
history and cultures? Answering these questions means casting light not only
on the past but also on the present and future of human signification.
The task is particularly difficult in the case of symbols that have been
semiotically so successful as to travel across centuries, sometimes millennia,
of human history. The abstract ideas they signify have become so engrained in
them that they are seen as inseparable. They have turned into “natural symbols”
of those ideas. The semiotician must therefore make a considerable metalinguis-
tic effort in order to decompose such unity, show its construction lines and, as a
consequence, reveal that other lines would have been possible, although they
were not followed by human civilizations. A further step semioticians might take
is seeking to explain why those alternative lines were not considered, and even
foresee what would happen, should they be followed instead.
Semioticians might be hated for undertaking such deconstructive effort.
After all, symbols are cherished exactly because they are “naturalized,” sur-
rounded by an aura that admits no alternatives. Symbols are comfortably
reassuring, like most aspects of human life that conceal their linguistic nature.
Yet, semioticians should be thanked, instead. The main reason for which sym-
bols often turn into communicative devices of power is that they seem to signify
without human intervention. They seem to have been handed down from history
like acheiropoietai images, exclusively shaped by divine hand. On the contrary,
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showing what human hands have contributed to the way in which symbols
mean what they mean is tantamount to blunting the rhetoric of power.
Semioticians keen on deciphering the patterns of meaning their contempor-
aries adopt and live by should therefore pay specific attention to ceremonies and
other symbolical apparatuses that mark the establishment of power. What are
the symbols a new king, pope, dictator, but also, in the democratic era, a new
government or prime minister appropriate, when wishing to communicate an
intended relation with power? Some of these symbols will be extremely binding
by virtue of their unreflective nature: their communicative impact will transcend
pondered interpretation, to such an extent that they will be displayed and read
in an entirely ritualistic manner.
2 A paradoxical symbol: The balance
The balance is one of these symbols. From ancient Egypt until the present time,
displaying a balance on a coat of arms, on the façade of a building, or on a flag,
has triggered an almost automatic reference to an abstract concept of equity and
justice, to the idea that power is and will be exerted in a fair and impartial way.
The connection is so strong across history and cultures, that no alternative
seems possible. What does a balance stand for? Justice! And what symbol can
stand for justice? A balance!
These answers cannot satisfy semiotics. What is a balance from the semiotic
point of view, indeed? Adopting a framework inspired by Peirce, it can be argued
that a balance is a device that produces and compares specific indexes. There are
different kinds of balances, with different names, but they all function according
to the same principle: given a certain object, when one places it in suitable
physical contiguity with a balance, for instance by laying it in one of its plates
or hanging it at one of its hooks, the physical structure of the balance changes,
determining the plates or the hook to move and the balance to tilt. Specialists in
historical metrology point out that some of the magical aura surrounding bal-
ances, scales, etc. might derive from the fact that the physical principle on the
basis of which these instruments work remained mysterious for a long time, at
least until the definition of “mass” in modern physics (Robens et al. 2014a: 419).
Scientists now perfectly know the physical principle according to which scales
tilt, yet the magical aura is still somehow there. It derives from the paradoxical
semiotic nature of the balance. As it was pointed out earlier, balances produce
and compare indexes. They bring about perceptible signs that stand for an
invisible entity, i. e., the comparative weight of an object. How much does an
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object weigh? This piece of information cannot be obtained by just looking at the
object. Of course, one can gauge the weight of an object by observing it, and yet
experience tells us that this procedure is imprecise. Weight, indeed, is not one of
the properties of the world that the human species is equipped to estimate
through sight. Alternatively, one may also seek to weigh an object by using
one’s own body as a balance. Those who have sought to thus weigh their suitcases
in view of complying with airline regulations, however, know well how deceiving
this procedure usually is. Again, experience tells us that our perception of the
weight of objects, when we lift, pull, push, or drag them, is so conditioned by our
own subjectivity (fatigue, etc.) as to be totally unreliable. The balance was there-
fore invented and introduced as a device that associates the weight of an object,
an invisible entity, to a visible index, the tilting of the balance.
The paradox of this semiotic device lies in the fact that, at least in principle,
it should not be a semiotic device. If one accepts Eco’s witty definition that
semiotics studies everything that can be used to lie (Eco 1975: 18), then a
balance is not a semiotic object, since it cannot lie. When a certain object is
placed on one of its plates, the balance will have to visually indicate the weight
of the object, with no alternative. The balance may, of course, be a fraud and
indicate a wrong measure, yet in that case too it would work exactly like a
distorting mirror (Eco 1985), faking its measurements with regularity, without
any semiotic fluctuation. Why, then, is the balance still to be considered as a
device that produces indexes, that is, signs?
Indexes are signs in which the relation between the object and the repre-
sentamen is based on causal contiguity: smoke, then fire. However, that does
not mean that indexes do not entail any interpretant. If it were thus, indexes
would not be signs. The relation between the representamen and the object
would be dyadic, non-mediated by any third entity, devoid of semiotic quality.
Where is the interpretant in indexes, then? It lies in the quality of causal
contiguity between the representamen and the object. In other words, although
smoke is physically caused by fire, knowledge of such causality is indispensable
in order for the smoke to turn into an indexical sign of fire. In the same way, it is
true that a balance cannot lie, meaning that it will always tilt in the same way
when an object is placed on one of its plates. However, it is also true that
knowledge of the way in which objects behave in space when placed on top of
other objects is fundamental in order to correctly “read” the indexes that a
balance produces.
Moreover, smoke can be considered as a pure index of fire only abstractedly. In
reality, smoke is never solely an index of fire but always an index of fire burning
something with specific qualities, at a certain distance, and in given atmospheric
conditions. The same quality that allows smoke to indexically signify fire, that is,
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color, also systematically reintroduces interpretation in its semiotic functioning.
Potential variety of colors entails alternative in the relation between fire and smoke,
resulting in multiplication of semiotic possibilities, as well as in variety of (mis)
interpretations. When cardinals retreat in conclave, for instance, the only sign
outsiders can rely on in order to know whether a new pope has been elected is
the color of smoke exhaling from the chimney of the stove in the Sistine Chapel.
Black smoke indicates failure in electing a new pope, whereas white smoke indi-
cates success. The color of smoke is an index, causally related to the materials
combusted in the stove. Yet, interpretation is fundamental so as to relate color to
combusted materials, and therefore to the cardinals’ activity in conclave. That is
why smoke is often misinterpreted: despite improvement in technological devices
adopted by the Vatican in order to emphasize difference between black and white
smoke during conclaves, uncertainty reigns at every new smoke signal, to the point
that, in 2005, a new acoustic sign, the ring of bells of Saint Peter’s Basilica, was
introduced in order to dispel the ambiguity.
In the same way, a balance produces indexes, which are signs based on
causal contiguity, yet the way in which this causal contiguity is created, trans-
lated into a visible representamen, and communicated as a measurement of the
weight of an object is not “natural” at all. Here is where the paradox lies: much
of the rhetorical force by virtue of which the balance has been adopted as
universal symbol of justice depends on presenting it as a non-semiotic device,
as something that cannot lie in any circumstances.
At this point of the essay, a recap is in order. Some symbols so skillfully
traverse epochs and cultures that they are depicted as almost “natural” embodi-
ments of abstract values. The balance is one of these symbols, adopted to
represent justice from ancient Egypt until the present time. Power appropriates
this “natural meaning” in order to construct a rhetoric of equity. Yet, semiotics
unveils that the balance, like every symbol, is not natural at all, but under-
pinned by a specific ideology. From the semiotic point of view, the balance is a
device that produces indexes, i. e., causal signs that visually signal an invisible
property, weight. Although this translation is not automatic, but based on
specific indexical circumstances (such as the type of balance, the weighing
techniques, and the measuring standards that are used), the balance is para-
doxically turned into a symbol of justice precisely because it is depicted as a
non-semiotic device, as an instrument that cannot lie, as a machine.
In other words, the balance becomes a universal symbol of justice, its
display being particularly emphasized in the rhetoric of (often unjust) power,
for the symbol promises to those who revere it what the balance itself promises
to those who use it: as the real balance will eliminate approximation, subjectiv-
ity, and interpretation from the task of weighing an object, so the symbolical
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balance of law will ban any idiosyncratic interference from the task of weighing
human acts, determining responsibilities, and attributing pains and rewards.
Behind the adoption of the balance as quintessential symbol of justice, there lies
the idea that adjudication can be performed as non-semiotic task, as mechanical
procedure where no interpretation is involved. Eliminating discretional influ-
ence in law: that is the ultimate promise of the balance.
3 The subjectivity of weighing
Historical and comparative metrology indicates that the process of weighing is far
from being devoid of any semiotic dimension. Abstractedly conceived, a balance
is a pure index-producing device. In reality, though, as the indexical relation
between smoke and fire, so that between mass and weight depends on a series of
indexical circumstances. One of them is the type of balance that is adopted, each
translating the invisible entity of weight into a visible indication of it through
different types of causal contiguity. Gravitational balances, counterweight bal-
ances, bioforce balances, elastic force balances, gyro balances, buoyancy bal-
ances, hydraulic balances, balances with electric force compensation, with
electromagnetic force compensation, with light pressure compensation, momen-
tum balances, oscillator balances, radiometric belt weighers, not to speak of
laboratory balances such as those for vacuum and controlled atmosphere, mag-
netic suspension balances, balances for thermogravimetry, sorptometry, mass
analyzers, etc.: this long series of devices translates the human longing for perfect
weighing, for a balance that eliminates any “noise” involved in associating a
certain object with the numerical expression of its weight. Each new technological
advancement, nevertheless, is followed by new obstacles on the road to absolute
precision: mechanical effects, buoyancy effects, gravitational effects, thermal
effects, electrostatic and magnetic effects, effects of the Brownian motion, etc.
Furthermore, historical metrology also indicates that what reintroduces alter-
native, semiosis, interpretation, and therefore the possibility of “error,” fraud, or
dispute in the act of weighing is not only weighing technology, but also metrolo-
gical strategy. A muid1 of salt imported from the Greek island of Santa Maura to
Venice would weigh 2,376 pounds. When it was exported, however, its weight
would vary depending on destination: 2,304 pounds for the farms of Venetian
Lombardy; 2,700 pounds for Turin and Milan; 2,064 pounds for the Venetian
Cadore, etc. (Hocquet 1986: 38). The weight of salt would, therefore, change
1 An ancient French “standard” for measuring the weight of salt.
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according to several parameters, such as the origin of merchandise, the place and
role of economic agents depending on whether they were selling or buying, the
nature of customers and their role on the international market, thei exposure to
foreign concurrency (Milan and Turin), Austrian smuggling through Trieste
(Cadore), political-economic privileges sanctioning fishing (such as in Caorle
and in Grado, where it was practiced by the most ancient populations of the
Duchy), etc.2
That is to say that the idea of a metrical system that covers the entire world,
and weighs human objects and activities independently from any interpretation of
collateral indexical circumstances is a typically modern idea, resulting from the
utopia of a reality that, by means of appropriate devices, offers a measure of itself
without any human intervention. One is left wondering whether the program of
objective, quantitative measurement of the world that is typical of positivist
modernity might be not only the pure outcome of technological improvement –
allowing a better human grasp of the “measures of the world” – but rather a
rhetoric, reinforcing a global numerical discourse wherein political interferences
still persist – conditioning the present trade of oil as they would influence the past
commerce of salt – but are much less visible that in pre-modern times, concealed
under an impenetrable curtain of numbers, standards, and parameters.
Analogously, one is left wondering whether the symbol of the balance –
visually conveying a juridical ideology in which adjudication takes place
through a legal system that, like a sophisticated weighing device, translates
human deeds into legal categories, providing an output of justice wherein no
subjectivity interferes – might also be part of the same numerical rhetoric of
modernity, one that pretends to weigh reality and preserve equity with no room
for biased interpretation. Former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi once
notoriously declared, during one of the many trials in which he was involved:
“That is true, law is equal for all, but for me it is more equal than for the others
because the majority of Italians voted for me” (spontaneous declaration at the
SME trial, June 17 2003).3 Isn’t the cynical paradox of this sentence more faithful
to the nature of law, also in the modern “democratic” era, than the symbol of the
balance, which rhetorically evokes an imaginaire of natural, automatic, and
mechanical equity?
In order to answer this question, the essay will take two directions. On the one
hand, it will continue exploring the visual rhetoric of the balance. Through a
historical and anthropological tour de force, it will seek to highlight “interrupted
paths” in the formation of this symbol. The balance as symbol of legal justice
2 See Hocquet (1986, 1990).
3 An involuntary self-sarcastic quote of Orwell’s Napoleon?
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became what it is not through natural evolution but through a series of semiotic
choices. Revealing such patterns of discarded alternatives will further emphasize
the rhetorical nature of the current symbol and its potential options. On the other
hand, the essay will formulate a proposal on how a post-modern perspective on
the visual rhetoric of the balance might be semiotically shaped. The point of
semiotics, indeed, should not be that of denying the human possibility of pro-
gressively refining the dynamics of adjudication, so as to asymptotically eliminate
unjust biases from it. It is, indeed, commendable that legal systems evolve toward
increasingly equitable procedures. The aim of semiotics is different: denouncing
the symbolical rhetoric that masks old injustices through new technologies of
(pseudo-)equity, and travesty the unbalance of adjudication through a vertiginous
evocation of void procedures, standards, and parameters as the symbol of the
balance conceals, by its cold impassibility, the human distortion of both physical
and juridical weighing.
It is not fortuitous, indeed, that among the many available types of balance,
cultural history selected the scales as visual epitome of the objectivity and
impersonality of law. Especially in the present-day visual rhetoric of just power,
the scales are indeed depicted as an icon, unrelated to any visual or narrative
context, as though they were an agent that does not necessitate any human
regulation or operation. The scales on their own visually weigh human beings,
mechanically and inexorably tilting when one of their plates is heavier than the
other, exactly as the legal system impersonally tilts in adjudication. Diving into
the depths of cultural history, though, one finds out that such aseptic imaginary of
law, justice, and adjudication as abstract balance stems from a long and tortuous
path of unselected alternatives.
4 China
Students of early Chinese historical metrology4 provide evidence that balances
with equal arms, like those that symbolize justice and equity in the western
rhetoric of just power, were predominant in early China (pre-Zhou period and
Zhu period, eleventh century – 221 B.C.E.).5 Another type of balance with
unequal arms, however, i. e., the steelyard, became prevalent in the Eastern
4 Bibliography on the history of weighing in China is abundant. For a bibliography, see
Theobald and Vogel (2004: 10–16 and 18–19).
5 On the pre-Zhou period, see Cai Yunzhang (1982), Qiu Guangming (1990, 1997); Qiu Guangming
et al. (2001: 254–262); on the Zhu-period, Wang Da (1959). See also Vankeerberghen (2005–2006:
48, n. 2).
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Han Times (25–220 C.E.).6 There is also evidence of a transitional type between
the two, with a fixed fulcrum in the middle but using leverage to determine an
object’s weight, used from the Warring States period on (475–221 B.C.E.).7 Early
China historical metrology reconstructs the material background against which
metaphorical usages of these various types of balance arose (Vankeerberghen
2005–2006).
As specialists have pointed out, such different modalities of weighing entail
increasing influence of human operations on the functioning of the balance and,
therefore, translate into metaphors of as many semiotic ideologies of equili-
brium, adjudication, and, more generally, legal power (Vogel 1994). Two diver-
ging metaphorical categories can be singled out. In the first, historically
predominant from the fourth century B.C.E. on, scales with equal arms prevail.
They evoke a semiotic ideology of quan, “balance,” that is similar to that
subscribed to by the western visual rhetoric of justice: as placing an object on
the scales numerically determines its weight with no human interference, so
exerting the faculty of quan means expelling all subjectivity from moral assess-
ment and self-assessment. The Guanzi8 – an encyclopedic compilation of
Chinese philosophical materials named after the seventh-century BCE philoso-
pher Guan Zhong,9 Prime Minister to Duke Huan of Qi – explicitly emphasizes
the non-semiosic, numeric (shu) nature of the act of weighing: “With the weigh-
ing beam one can determine a number for a thing’s weight.”10 Early Chinese
political and philosophical texts adopt this numeric semiotic ideology of balance
and transpose it into the moral domain. The famous Confucian philosopher
Mencius,11 thus, admonished King Xuan of Qi to “measure his own heart,”12
implying that quan, equilibrium, exactly consists in exerting power by discard-
ing the troublesome influence of subjective emotions and interpretations. Moral
adjudication is therefore conceived of as quantifiable as weighing is.
The Huainanzi,13 a second-century BCE Chinese philosophical classic from
the Han dynasty, offers a counterpart to this numeric, quantitative understand-
ing of quan and weighing:
6 See Guo Zhengzhong (1994) and Vogel (1997).
7 See Liu Dongrui (1990).
8 For an introduction to literature on Guanzi, see Rickett (1993).
9 C. 720–645 B.C.E.
10 Guanzi jiaoshi, 521 (“Mingfa jie”). We follow the translation provided by Vankeerberghen
(2005–2006: 65–6).
11 C. 372–289 B.C.E. For an introduction, see Shun (1997).
12 Mencius 1 A 7.
13 For an introduction, Vankeerberghen (2001).
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Therefore, when the sage negotiates things being bent or straight, he bends and stretches,
lies down or looks upward with them. Without relying on an eternal standard, he some-
times bends, sometimes stretches. When he is being meek and weak as cattail or leather,
do not think he is being snatched away; when he is rigid and forceful, fierce and
determined, his will as strong as the azure clouds, do not think he is boastful or self-
important: that is how he rides the times, and responds to changes.14
In this and other passages from the same cultural epoch, moral judgment is not
conceived of as mechanical act, wherein a moral balance automatically trans-
lates human deeds into numbers, but as highly semiotic endeavor, in which
human agency does not hide under the impersonality of the balance but makes
itself conspicuous in its role and agency of constant adjustment. As a conse-
quence, the steelyard, instead of the scales, becomes the symbol of adjudication,
i. e., the icon of a weighing mechanism that a human hand persistently adapts to
circumstances, exactly as the leverage of a steelyard must be manipulated in
order to reach quan, balance. The Book of Documents (Shujing, earlier Shu-king)
or Classic of History, also known as the Shangshu,15 one of the Five Classics of
ancient Chinese literature, explicitly transfers this imaginaire of adjustment to
the domain of legal adjudication:
When a crime falls within a high category of punishments but there are extenuating
circumstances, serve a lower sentence. When it falls within a low category of punishments
but there are aggravating circumstances, serve a higher sentence. In determining the
lightness and heaviness of all penalties, there is weighing. Even if punishments and
penalties are light in some periods and heavy in others, in equalizing what is not equalized
there is order and there are essentials.16
The opposition between a semiotic ideology of law in which the scales are the
prevailing symbol, and human agency conceals behind the impartiality of
mechanic adjudication, and a semiotic ideology of judgment in which, on the
contrary, the steelyard is the predominant material metaphor, and human
agency displays itself in the exercise of continuous moral adjustment, should
not be situated along an evolutionary line (from more rigid to more flexible
conceptions of adjudication), but in a sort of a-temporal anthropological dialec-
tics, in which two different abstract models of equity and justice are confronted.
Subsequent to Han scholarship, indeed, Song hermeneutics of quan conveys
moral deprecation of the previous understanding of weighing, balance, and
14 Huainan honglie jijie, 443–44. We follow the translation provided by Vankeerberghen
(2005–2006: 81).
15 For an introduction to literature, see Shaughnessy (1993).
16 “Lü xing” chapter, 259. We follow the translation provided by Vankeerberghen (2005–2006:
55).
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adjudication – in a way that is reminiscent of Pascal’s contempt vis-à-vis early-
modern casuistry17 – and points at the metaphor of the steelyard and its
movable leverage mechanism as to a dangerous occasion for arbitrariness to
penetrate the realm of law.
5 Egypt
The analogy with the Provinciales suggests that the dialectics between opposite
imaginaires of weighing and adjudication might characterize also the history of
semiotic ideologies of law in the west. One of its most ancient roots is to be found
in the metaphoric use of the balance in ancient Egyptian texts. The Coffin Texts18 –
a collection of ancient Egyptian funerary spells written on coffins beginning in the
First Intermediate Period (ca. 2181–2055 B.C.E.), deriving in part from the earlier
pyramid texts – already refer to weighing in the context of judgment that dead
people must undergo in the afterlife (Grieshammer 1970: 46–48). In one of these
texts it is said: “Both doors of heaven will be open for your perfectibility, so that
you egress and see Hathor. Your evil will be cast out, your wrongdoing erased by
those who weigh the qualities with the scales on the day of judgment.”19 However,
the text does not provide precise indication about how the weighing is to be
performed.
In another Coffin Text, weighing is personified under demonic form. The dead
one addresses Re with a prayer for help: “Save me from this God with occult
shape, whose eyebrows are the beams of the balance, on that day of reckoning
with the snatcher, who lays manacles on evildoers, so as to lacerate their souls.”20
Whereas, as it shall be seen, in later texts the judgment of “souls” is performed
through a real balance, and usually through scales, in this coffin text separation
between the impersonal agency of the balance and the subjective agency of its
user has not taken place yet. Indeed, the weighing mechanism is embodied by the
judge through the curious figure of the eyebrows-beams: evidently, the result of
weighing will be tantamount to the emotional reaction of the judge, as expressed
on his face; the severe inclination of the eyebrows will correspond to the fatal
inclination of the beams.
17 See Jonsen and Toulmin (1990).
18 See Faulkner (1973–1978).
19 CT I 181a-e [44]. In this and subsequent quotations from the Coffin Texts we follow, with
small changes, the translation provided in Buck (1935–2006).
20 CT IV 298a-301a [335].
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Nevertheless, another fragment reads: “You weigh with the balance of
Thot,”21 which suggests that the scene of weighing evolves toward a separation
of the balance and the judge, as well as toward a separation of their agencies:
the act of weighing is demanded to a god, whose specific duty is to secure a
correct functioning of the balance. Such evolution is confirmed and further
specified in the Book of the Dead, an ancient Egyptian funerary text, used
from the beginning of the New Kingdom (around 1550 B.C.E.) until around 50
B.C.E.22 Chapter 125 of the Book describes the famous ritual of the “weighing of
the heart,” which is also found depicted in countless contemporary vignettes
(Seeber 1976).
In this procedure, the heart of the dead is placed on one of the two plates of
a grand balance scale, while on the other plate lies the symbol of ma’at, the
ancient Egyptian concept of truth, balance, order, law, morality, and justice
(Assmann 2001: 132–6). The dead must perform a recitation in front of the
balance, accounting for their deeds. What is a stake, though, is not the recount
of a life-story, but the truthfulness of recitation. The heart, indeed, figures as
witness of the process, and by no means it must disavow the recitation. Several
characters, besides the defendant, usually participate in the judgment. Anubis,
Horus (from the 21st dynasty), or even Ma’at itself usher the dead toward the
weighing scene. Horus and Ma’at also appear as weigh-masters and minute-
takers, but these roles are more commonly assigned to Thoth, as anticipated in
Coffin Texts. Osiris presides over the entire judgment.
An interesting aspect of many verbal and graphic depictions of the scene of
judgment in the Book of Dead is the so-called “doubling of Ma’at.” Ma’at indeed
appears in these depictions both as the entity (usually symbolized as a feather of
ostrich) against which the heart of the dead is to be weighed, and as personi-
fication of the concept of justice, confronting the recitation of the defendant. As
a result, the hall of judgment is called “the Hall of double Ma’at.” In some cases,
moreover, a third instance of Ma’at appears as the mystagogue that ushers the
dead toward the judgment. Such multiplication of actors, playing the several
roles of Ma’at in the judgment scene, has been variously interpreted (Hornung
1987).
From the point of view of the present paper, what matters is mostly the
comparison between such diffracted scene of judgment and that of the Coffin
Texts, where the balance, the judge, and the punisher were embodied by the
same persona. In graphic representations of the “Hall of double Ma’at,” on the
contrary, these roles are not only distributed among different actors, but also
21 CT I 209d [47].
22 For an introduction, Faulkner and von Dassow (1994).
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presented in an abstract way, so that different figures can visualize the various
roles of a single principle. Considered in the framework of the long-term evolu-
tion of weighing as metaphor of adjudication, this multiplication/abstraction
points to the progressive shaping of a “bureaucracy of weighing.” The subjec-
tivity of the balance/law/judge/punisher is replaced by a complex arena in
which the mechanical agency of the balance can emerge exactly insofar as it
stripped from the other personae of the scene of judgment, which are visually
and narratively distributed all around.
The passage from Coffin Texts to the Book of the Dead signals an evolution
of the semiotic ideology of law that is opposite to that described in relation to
the imaginary of weighing in ancient China: in Egypt, the Book of the Dead
marks what is probably the very beginning of the western rhetoric of law as
impersonal, objective agency, whose standardized mechanisms of adjudication
are comparable to the functioning of a balance scale. Should this standardiza-
tion, mechanization, and bureaucratization of law be considered a consequence
of the so-called “democratization of afterlife,” which took place after the First
Intermediate Period? Is the construction of an articulated scene of transcendent
judgment to be connected with the parallel evolution of a less hierarchical
society, whose horizontal tendencies would express themselves also in the
institution of the “machine of law”?
Students of ancient Egyptian law should answer these questions. From the
semiotic point of view, it is important to underline that the balance as para-
doxical icon of a non-semiotic, impersonal, and numeric practice of law might
emerge in connection with historical and cultural contexts in which large
numbers of people are given access to law and its ways of adjudication. That
is certainly true as regards the passage to the Egyptian New Kingdom, wherein
less rigid boundaries among social classes also entailed a progressive widening
and professionalization of the “Hall of Ma’at.”
Is therefore the “visual rhetoric of just power” to be considered as inevitable
side-effect of the democratization of law, as attempt by the vertical power of the
king to conceal behind such an icon of objectivity as the balance? The ideolo-
gical dilemma inscribed in the hermeneutical conflict dividing Han and Song
legal scholars should perhaps be read on an anthropological, trans-historical,
and cross-cultural scale: on the one hand, the more the law turns into imperso-
nal agency, the more it seems adequate to give rise to just adjudication in a
democratic society, where many, most, or even all can access the law; on the
other hand, the more the law becomes numeric bureaucracy, the less it seems
suitable to do justice to circumstances, exceptions, and subjectivities: all are
weighed in the same way by the balance of law, but the output of this mechanic
process is cold measure and number, whose potential injustice is even more
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difficult to detect for the balance does not have any face, unlike the monstrous
balance-judge of the Coffin Texts.
6 Greece
The idea of a superior being that presides over the judgment of mortals, weigh-
ing their deeds on a scale, is not exclusive of the Egyptian civilization but
transfers, through labyrinthine paths, to ancient Greece.23 Zeus weighs the
keres of the Greeks and Trojans in Iliad (8.69–74). Furthermore, a famous
passage of the Iliad (22.209–13) reads:
Then father Zeus balanced his golden scales (χρύσεια … τάλαντα),
and in them he set two fateful portions of
woeful death (δύο κήρε τανηλεγέος θανάτοιο), one for
Achilles and one for Hector, breaker of horses. Balancing
it in the middle, Zeus raised it high, and the fated day
(αἴσιμον ἦμαρ) of Hector sank down: it went toward the
house of Hades, and the god Apollo left him.
Also, the scales incline towards Oedipus’s guilt in Sophocles’s tragedy (847;
Musurillo 1957: 45). Furthermore, the Aethiopis, the lost epic of ancient Greek
literature, would also contain a scene of kerostasia,24 which would have inspired
a lost work by Aeschylus, the Psychostasia (schol. A ad 8.70 and Eustathius on
8.73 (699.31)).25
Abundant literature on the topic has focused especially on Iliad (22.209–13),
seeking to solve that which modern readers perceive as a paradox: if the fate of
Hector is already doomed, why does Zeus weigh his kere on the scales against
the kere of Achilles? Most commentators have underlined that, in this passage,
the scales are not an instrument of adjudication but a narrative device, signaling
that the poem will allow no further deviations from the destiny of the two
characters. Thus, Willcock (1976: 86–87) claims that the weighing is “not a
process of decision by Zeus; it is rather a symbolic representation of what is
fated to happen;” Vermeule (1979: 76) points out that it is “not a judgement, but
an external affirmation of destiny.” For Erbse (1986: 289), the scales “only serve
to give an expression of necessity.” Similarly, Edwards (1987: 294) argues: “the
23 A classic, but still tentative and much debated study of this transition is in Wüst (1936). For
a criticism, Björk (1945). For a discussion, Dietrich (1964).
24 For a discussion, see Irvine (1997: 43) and Rozokoki (2009: 9).
25 On difference between kerostasia and psychostasia, see Burgess (2004).
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scales are an indication of what will happen, an artistic means of creating
tension, not a real decision-making device.” Analogously, referring to Iliad
8.69–74, Taplin (1992: 141 note 20) comments: “the scales do not decide this
[the victory of Troy]; they mark a crisis in the narrative. In some passages,
indeed, they become a purely figurative way of indicating a turning point.”
Not dissimilarly, Morrison (1997: 293) circumscribes the meaning of Zeus’s scales
to the narrative dimension:
What is significant about kerostasia is that it brings the three contexts together. The setting
out of the scales is an action by the gods. Yet the effect is to determine the future of heroes
fighting on the field of battle. Finally, in narrative terms, kerostasia signals the imminent
fulfillment of the story as earlier foreshadowed by divine and poetic predictions.
From the point of view adopted by the present essay, though, all these com-
ments seem to miss an important aspect of Zeus’s kerostasia. They all argue that,
since the fate of Hector is decided before the weighing of his kere on the scales
against that of Achilles, then the scales themselves cannot be considered as a
decisional device, as an instrument of adjudication. However, one could argue
that the juridical relevance of this and similar passages exactly consists in
instituting the scales as symbolical reference to a transcendent order, whose
impersonal determinations dominate the subjective, personal decisional inclina-
tions of Zeus. The symbolical shift by which the agency of adjudication is
stripped from Zeus and attributed to his instrument is analogous to that which
conceals the personality of judgment behind the symbol of the scales in most of
the western history of this icon of law and justice. Hence, the scales that tilt in
disfavor of Hector are not only a narrative device, signaling that no further
deviations from fate will be admitted in the plot of the Iliad, but also a meta-
juridical device, displacing the agency and responsibility of judgment from Zeus
to Moira or Aisa, the impersonal destiny.
Depictions of kerostasia seem to confirm this interpretation (Shapiro 1990).
The oldest visual representation of kerostasia, in which Zeus determines the
outcome of the battle between two contenders by weighing their keres on the
plates of a scale, appears on a dinos26 (Vienna, 3619) and dates from 540 B.C.E.
In a coeval depiction, on a cup by Epiktetos now in the museum of Villa Giulia
in Rome (57912), Hermes handles the scales, while Zeus and Hera observe from
distance the scene of the infuriating battle between Achilles and Memnon
(Simon 1959: 72–82; Slatkin 1986: 3–4 n. 5). From the point of view of the
present essay, it is significant that, in all these depictions, Zeus does not take
any decision on the fate of the mortal combat but rather appears as the mediator
26 A mixing bowl.
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of superior or collateral agencies, such as that of moirai, the Greek incarnation of
destiny. In the Roman cup, the lack of Zeus’s personal agency in weighing,
judgment, and determination of fate is further emphasized by the “professiona-
lization” of weighing itself. As in the Book of the Dead the handling of the scale
balance was delegated to Thoth, so in the Attic iconography it is Hermes, the
Greek god of ruse, which figures as “impersonal technician of weighing.”
The Greek scene of adjudication significantly differs from the Egyptian one.
In the former case, living human beings are weighed and judged, not dead
people. Furthermore, judgment does not involve comparison between recitation
and heart, but between two simulacra of the battling contenders. The Egyptian
scene of weighing and judgment, moreover, displays an evident character of
initiation, which the Greek scene lacks completely. Yet, something connects the
two imaginaries at a more abstract level: both seem to be underpinned by a
semiotic ideology of law in which the conception of a superior ontological order,
from which judgment of the inferior one emanates, is accompanied by the
institution of an impersonal agency, symbolically embodied by the scales,
which implements the order established in the upper dimension and applies it
to the lower one, but without a personal, subjective intrusion of the former into
the latter. Judgment proceeds from a superior ontology, and yet the agency of it
remains hidden in the automatic mechanism of the scales, whose correct func-
tioning is entrusted to Hermes’s technique.
The transfer of adjudicating agency from Zeus to the scales is paralleled by
the historical and cultural process through which the Greek civilization first builds
the abstract concept of justice, as well as the germane idea of righteousness, then
impersonates them through feminine, ideal goddesses, then provides them with
the scales. However, this process does not entail that the scales of justice regain
an aspect of personality and subjectivity, since the passage from the justice of
Zeus to that of Dike, from a male agency to a female agency, implies, on the
opposite, a de-personalization of the adjudicating agency. Dike takes shape as a
personification of justice in Hesiod’s Theogony (901), but it is in the Homeric
Hymns that its name is associated with the instrument of the scales (δíκης
ταλάντα, 324).27 By the fifth century, the balance has become a customary attri-
bute of Dike, as is evident from Aeschylus, Libation Bearers 55: “But the balance of
Dike keeps watch: swiftly it descends on those in the light; sometimes pain waits
for those who linger on the frontier of twilight; and others are claimed by
27 For a discussion of this personification, and its association with the scales of Zeus, see
Gagarin (1974: 189).
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strengthless night”; as well as from Bacchylides, Fragment 5: “If some god had
been holding level the balance of Dike (Justice).”
7 Rome
The Greek pantheon imperfectly translates into the Roman one. Nevertheless,
continuity can be seen between Dike and Dikayosune on the one hand and, on
the other hand, the Roman goddesses of Iustitia and Aequitas. In the Roman case
too, female embodiments signify further abstraction of agency. The semantic fields
of Aequitas and Iustitia often overlap, and so do their iconographies (Manders
2012: 182). Cicero refers to them interchangeably in De Officiis (2.5.18; 3.6.28), but
overall Iustitia seems to preside more over the letter of the law, Aequitas over its
spirit. Modern commentators therefore translate the latter in English as “fairness,”
as quality that is required not only for legal judgment, but also for moral judgment
(Strack 1931–1937, 1: 154–64; Noreña 2001: 158).
The enlargement of the semantic field of Aequitas in relation to Iustitia implies
a further democratization, but also a further vulgarization, of the symbol of the
scales. In the roman pantheon, Aequitas turns into the minor goddess of fair trade
and honest merchants. Moreover, it too, like Iustitia, becomes one of the indis-
pensable virtues of Roman imperial power and rhetoric, but with a significant
specification. In its variant of Aequitas Augusti, its female personification abun-
dantly appears on coins,28 visually declaring the fairness of the Emperor in
vouching for the correct measure of precious metal therein contained (Wallace-
Hadrill 1981: n. 57). The identification of Aequitas with Iuno Moneta under Galba,29
in particular, entails important semiotic consequences.
First, the association of the scales with Aequitas-Moneta suggests that an
increase in the abstraction of agency behind the mechanism of weighing is
inextricably linked, in this context too, with further democratization of the process
of adjudication. The scales are not associated with a god who presides over the
momentous judgment of the dead, or to the determination of fate in epic battle;
instead, they become a device of “everyday adjudication,” used by merchants in
trivial transactions.
28 Aequitas types represent about one quarter of all virtue types on denarii minted between 69
and 235 C.E. See Lichocka (1974), but cf. Metcalf (1977).
29 Emperor Servius Sulpicius Galba Caesar Augustus, Terracina, current Italy, 24 December 3
B.C.E. – Rome, 15 January 69 C.E.
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Second, the progressive vanishing of the scales’ aura is confirmed by their
iconographic reproducibility. The scales do not appear in individualized contexts
such as Coffin Texts, vignettes related to the Book of the Dead (Egypt), Homeric
verses or Attic vases (Greece). The scales are inscribed in the object that epito-
mizes the standardization of value in the history of humanity: coins. Examples are
countless: Aequitas appears on the reverse of antoniani [ = 2 Denarii], struck under
Roman Emperor Claudius II. The goddess holds her symbols, the balance in
perfect equilibrium, in the right, and the cornucopia, in the left. The implicit
message contained in this visual rhetoric is that a subjective, personal agency,
open to semiosis and interpretation, is not necessary anymore, supplanted by an
abstract principle of fairness that is vouched for by a numeric device, coins. The
icon guarantees the value of the coin, but the coin simultaneously multiplies and
dilutes the value of the icon. Aequitas is in the hands of everybody, because it is in
the hands of nobody. It is, literally, a measure, a digit, an entity that exclude all
human interference.
8 Conclusion: The frowning balance
Through complex historical ways and cultural patterns, which cannot be summar-
ized in this context, but whichmake the object of abundant literature, the Egyptian,
Greek, and Roman imaginaire of the balance, together with the Jewish biblical one,
constituted the background against which the Christian idea of the “weighing of the
souls” evolved.30 Such imaginaire contains distinctive features, but some of its most
important elements can clearly be traced back to their pre-Christian roots. Indeed, in
the Christian civilization too, the more the idea of an individual judgment of the
souls immediately after death gained upon the idea of a final judgment to which all
souls would be subjected at the end of times, the more the agency of spiritual
judgment and adjudication turned abstract, professional, and impersonal, the
scales of metaphysical weighing being increasingly displaced from the personal
hands of God or Jesus to those of specialized agents like the Archangel Michael.31
30 Literature on this evolution is very rich. See Schuck (1936) for a study of the transition from
the Roman to the Christian scales, and meticulous survey of previous (esp. nineteenth-century)
literature on the topic.
31 An extensive analysis of the development of the Christian medieval symbolism and icono-
graphy of the scales is in Perry (1912, 1913). On the Jewish roots of the imaginaire of the
psychostasy, see also Barasch (2005). On its iconography, Markow (1983–1984, 1984). On the
theological and juridical evolution of the idea of individual adjudication of souls, see Gaiffier
(1952); Baschet (1995, 2008).
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This process, however, does not concern only the religious domain but also
the secular one. The iconography of justice as a blind goddess appears at the
dawn of modernity, and coincides with the disappearing of a series of topoi,
motives, and representations that would point out, on the contrary, the inevi-
table personality of adjudication, its pathos, and the suffering that it both feels
and inflicts in the painful process of judgment (Resnik and Curtis 2007). The
cultural as well as the emotional distance of this modern blind goddess from the
Egyptian god-balance, whose irate frowning would embody the tilting of the
scales of judgment, is abysmal. We certainly would not like to regress to that
imaginaire, which is all too vividly engrained in present-day dictatorial “legal
systems” around the world. Yet, as it was promised at the beginning of the
present paper, semiotics must warn not only against icons of law in which
idiosyncratic semiosis and interpretation occupy the entire arena of judgment,
expelling the regularity of any legal habit, code, and system, but also against
icons of law that, on the contrary, expunge any reference to the personality of
judgment in order to extol the quality of cold, objective, and numeric weighing.
Self-evidently, we would not like to be judged by dictatorial agents, who
would tilt their balances as they please and attribute weight at their discretion.
But would we like to be judged by balances that no human hand sets and
operates, by machines, for which judgment is inexorably deductive extraction of
results from the cold matching of rules and cases? If the semiotic and cross-
cultural exploration of the millenary imaginaire of the scales serves a purpose, it is
not that of suggesting an answer, claiming that human sensibility and qualitative
attention will be always required in both legal and moral adjudication. Instead,
the aim of semiotic analysis is to show that the question itself is incorrect, and
that behind every self-operating balance, and every rhetoric of cold measurement,
and every discourse of impassive statistics, there still lies an Egyptian god,
impulsively frowning at the world, although his eyebrows are now so distant
and well disguised under the beams of sophisticate balances, that we don’t
recognize them anymore.
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Cai Yunzhang [蔡運章]. 1982. Lüe de zhongliang ji xiangguan wenti [寽的重量及相關問題]
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